Excerpt from Master of the Senate by Robert A. Caro, plus links to reviews, author biography & more

It was Lyndon Johnson who called up the non-controversial bills that had been reported out of committees, moved their consideration and shepherded them efficiently through the process of passage. After the presiding officer had ordered a clerk to "state the bill by title for the information of the Senate," and had then said, "The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Texas," Johnson would either have the committee chairman briefly explain the measure---"I call the motion to the attention of the distinguished senator from Oklahoma"---or would briefly explain it himself.

And it was Lyndon Johnson who gave the Senate its schedule---in a tone of authority that let the Senate know that it was he, and he alone, who was establishing that schedule.

"Mr. President," he would say, "I wish the Senate to be on notice that the Senate will consider on next Tuesday the State Department Appropriation Bill. The mutual security bill probably will be reported to the Senate by then and be available for consideration on that day. It is my understanding that the Committee on Banking and Currency hopes to report a housing bill. If it is reported as expected, it is my hope that the housing bill be considered sometime next week. If action can be had on the minimum wage bill, it is my plan to schedule it for consideration by the Senate as soon as it is reported out of committee." He would make verbal gestures toward those who presumably were also involved in the scheduling process---"If the committees will report the bills---and I do not urge them to do so until they have thoroughly considered them and have reached full accord on them---the Policy Committee, and I am sure the Minority Leader will cooperate as he has in the past, will schedule the bills quickly." But at the slightest hint that some other member of the Senate was daring to interject himself, no matter how slightly, in the process, Johnson reminded him who was in charge. In May, 1955, for example, Republican Charles Potter of Michigan, whose state was vitally interested in an early vote on the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention, a treaty with Canada, ventured to press Johnson a bit too hard on when the vote might be taken.

"When did [the Majority Leader] say he would call up the Convention?" Potter asked.

"The distinguished senator from Michigan has spoken with me on several occasions about the Fisheries Convention," Johnson replied. "I am anxious to cooperate with him, as he has always cooperated with the Democratic side of the aisle, particularly with the leadership. If it is possible to call up the Convention on next Tuesday, it will be done." On such occasions, Johnson's tone indicated clearly that if it wasn't possible, it wouldn't be done. And senators hearing the exchange could hardly help being reminded of what might have happened to Potter's cherished treaty if he had not "always cooperated with . . . the leadership."


These matters of scheduling were mostly routine, on non-controversial bills. But there were also the controversial bills, the major legislation. Passage of such legislation---winning on the major bills---was as difficult for Lyndon Johnson as it had always been for Majority Leaders, for he was in as precarious a position as any of his predecessors; what position, indeed, could be more precarious than that of a Leader with a one-vote margin, particularly when the party that was supposed to provide that margin was divided as deeply as his was divided? The Senate as a whole was divided on almost every major issue; with blocs of senators---Mountain States senators, Prairie States senators, Northeast urban votes, Southern Caucus votes---certain to oppose one issue or another, there were few proposals on which a majority vote was certain.

Because of these divisions, passage of most significant legislation required putting together, for each bill, a new, unique, collection of votes, and the margin would always be narrow---every vote counted. And Lyndon Johnson needed on each separate major bill votes not only for the bill but for the unanimous consent agreement that alone could insure that the bill could be brought to a vote, and that the differences between voting blocs and between individual senators had been sufficiently bridged so that when the votes were counted he would have a majority. So each major bill was the subject of countless negotiations.

Excerpted from Master of the Senate by Robert A. Caro Copyright 2002 by Robert A. Caro. Excerpted by permission of Knopf, a division of Random House, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.