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The Making of a Terrorist
by Jonathan Randal
If Osama had planned his own endgame, was he resigned to his fate and even
anxious to embrace the martyrdom he had so helped popularize? He may have
reckoned that he and Al-Qaeda could not reasonably hope to match, much less
outdo, 9/11. With his health then rumored to be undermined by an implacable
kidney affliction and an often-incurable heart condition called Marfan's
syndrome that threatens early death, had he decided to bow out at the top of his
form, at age forty-four, rather than risk an uncertain future that might tarnish
his legend? Such was the subject of endless speculation and the stuff of a myth
that he and his followers were intent on creating.
But in the practical world what mattered immediately was that Osama,
deliberately or by miscalculation, had acted like a Muslim Samson. He had
brought the temple down on his Taliban hosts and jeopardized the peerless Afghan
sanctuary that had allowed his Al-Qaeda to grow without serious challenge and to
extend its operations virtually worldwide. The tantalizing mystery of his fate
masked that reality. Inconclusive mountain battles and collusion with
like-minded Islamic radicals in Pakistan helped maintain the illusion of intact
Al-Qaeda discipline and strength. Well into 2002, Al-Qaeda and Taliban
operatives found refuge in the wild and wooly tribal areas along the Afghan
border in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, which had scarcely changed
since Kipling's day. Yet the Pakistanis caught hundreds of his operatives, many
of them mere foot soldiers, and turned them over to the Americans. In April his
key young lieutenant, Abu Zubaydah, was wounded and captured in a shoot-out 200
miles to the east, in Faisalabad, near the Indian frontier. In September Ramzi
bin al-Shibh, a key cog in the Hamburg cell entrusted with the 9/11 operation,
was captured in teeming Karachi, Pakistan's chaotic and lawless principal port.
Indeed there is a world of difference between having the free run of an entire
country and the uncertainties of clandestine refuge in Pakistan and elsewhere.
Whatever Al-Qaeda's long-standing connections, Pakistan now was run by a general
who had stopped openly flirting with Islamist radicals and had thrown in his lot
with Washington only days after September 11. Until then, ever since Osama had
returned to Jalalabad in 1996, he had done pretty much what he wanted in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Money and old networks stitched together nearly twenty
years earlier during the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan stood
him in good stead in both countries.
Osama had come so very far since the 1980s, when he had arrived in Afghanistan
as an untested youth with little experience but great ambitions. He, who then
had been manipulated, had become a past master of flattery, influencing, even
threatening those he needed for his purposes. Over the years he had learned to
cut corners while still projecting to his followers the image of an
uncompromisingly pure man of action. For all his outward devotion to the details
of obscurantist Islamic practice, he thought nothing of transgressing his
Taliban hosts' puritanical rules. Not for him were Taliban prohibitions on such
symbols of modernity as computers, television sets, audio- and videotapes, which
were ritually draped by the religious police from trees as satanic works of the
infidels.
Above all else, he had been careful to cultivate Mullah Mohammed Omar, the
rustic one-eyed Pashtun Taliban leader who one day in Kandahar had donned the
cloak that legend claimed was the Prophet's own, thus proclaiming himself the
commander of the faithful. In some American circles it became popular to insist
that Osama had turned Mullah Omar into his malleable creature. Initially, the
record showed no more than that Osama was indeed constantly careful to keep him
sweet. Osama supplied him with fancy four-wheel-drive vehicles, cash and
flattery, for he knew his own precarious presence in Afghanistan depended solely
on Mullah Omar's sufferance. Osama was well aware that some hardheaded Taliban
leaders had sought to persuade Mullah Omar to jettison a foreigner who, for all
his Islamic credentials in the war against the Red Army, increasingly
represented a mortal danger to their regime.
Excerpted from Osama by Jonathan Randal Copyright© 2004 by Jonathan Randal. Excerpted by permission of Knopf, a division of Random House, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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