Excerpt from Bin Laden by Yossef Bodansky, plus links to reviews, author biography & more

The Soviet Union moved quickly to blunt the Islamic militant movement, pointing to the disunity of the Arab world and challenging its right to speak for the entire Muslim population. The Soviet Union countered by claiming that it was the genuine supporter of Islam. "Showing respect for the religious feelings of the masses, the USSR holds out the hand of solidarity and friendship to all Muslims who are struggling against imperialist forces and exploitation for the right to control their own destiny, for freedom, independence, and economic and social progress," wrote A. Vasiliev, a pseudonym used by the Kremlin to signal an authoritative message delivered by a senior official. The Soviets also warned the Muslim world against "the imperialist threat" now being concealed "behind the concern for Islam" and reminded the Arabs of its long-standing support during their military confrontations with Israel and the West. Moscow urged the Muslim world to examine its intervention in Afghanistan accordingly.

Even if Arab governments were not convinced by the Soviet propaganda, they were disinclined to confront the Soviet Union, mostly because of military realities. Soviet forces were poised on the Afghan border, over-looking the Persian Gulf and an Iran in turmoil. Prince Turki al-Faisal, the head of Saudi intelligence, observed in early 1980 that the ultimate Soviet objective was "our oil. . . . At this moment we do not expect an invasion, but we do expect the Soviets to use their power to maneuver themselves into a position to make arrangements for a guaranteed oil supply." Rhetoric notwithstanding, Riyadh's interest in Afghanistan was strategic -- the sanctity of Saudi Arabia's oil fields. Although the concern for Islamic solidarity expressed by the Saudis was genuine, it was not their primary concern. This distinction is important in understanding the role bin Laden would soon play in the escalating war in Afghanistan.

If the Arab world entertained any hopes after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan that the United States would save it in case of further Soviet encroachment, these hopes were soon dispelled. The United States' aborted rescue attempt in Iran on the night of April 24 to 25, 1980, demonstrated Arab vulnerability. In November 1979, after the Iranian revolution, a group of Iran's unofficial intelligence service, with the support of the country's elite and the KGB, had seized the U.S. Embassy and taken sixty-three Americans hostage, demanding U.S. disengagement and withdrawal from the region and the return of frozen funds for the hostages' release. Elite U.S. forces attempted to rescue the American hostages, held by Iranian militants in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The mission failed due to a shortage of helicopters and a collision between a tanker aircraft and a helicopter during preparations for withdrawal. The specter of the burned hulks of U.S. air-craft and helicopters, the bodies of a few American servicemen, and the hastily abandoned helicopters provided by a jubilant Iranian TV brought home the American humiliation. For the Arab rulers in the shadow of Afghanistan, this demonstrated America's military incompetence and proved that Washington could not be relied on to save these regimes from the growing Soviet threat. The Soviets capitalized on the failed show of force, emphasizing that the U.S. rescue operation was actually intended "to return Iran to the zone of American influence." This opinion was shared by leaders in Persian Gulf capitals.

In the spring of 1980 fear and caution became the main characteristics of Arab policy toward the Soviet Union and the Afghan question. Arab governments could not ignore the fact that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan cut in half the distance that Soviet forces, aircraft, and missiles would need to travel to reach the Persian Gulf. "The Soviet shadow over this area looms so large that many Muslim regimes cannot find the courage to challenge it; the more savagely the Russians deal with the Afghan resistance, the greater the dread which they strike into the heart of other Muslim countries," observed Professor Richard Pipes, director of East European and Soviet Affairs for the National Security Council during the first years of the Reagan administration. Changes in the Muslims' position were visible in the follow-up conference of Islamic states in May 1980. The denunciation of the Soviet Union that emerged was somewhat milder than it had been four months earlier. More important, the demand not to recognize or deal with the government in Kabul was removed from the resolution.

Excerpted from bin Laden by Yossef Bodansky Copyright 2001 by Yossef Bodansky. Excerpted by permission of Prima Lifestyles, a division of Random House, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.